Civil Wars

Violence, Legitimacy, and Control: The Microdynamics of Support Relationships between Militant Groups and their Social Environment

Stefan Malthaner

Published online: 22 Feb 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Violence, Legitimacy, and Control: The Micro-dynamics of Support Relationships between Militant Groups and their Social Environment

STEFAN MALTHANER

Department of Political Sciences and Government, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

When police moved against a mosque known to be a stronghold of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) in a neighbourhood in northeastern Cairo in summer 1988, they quickly became involved in street battles in which they were confronted not only by members of the militant Islamist group but also by many ordinary residents, including teenagers and elderly women throwing stones from balconies. It was obvious that the group had built a considerable base of support in the area: 'They were very good young people', one resident explained. The Islamists 'used to have very active social work around their mosque. […] They collected donations for needy families and intervened in family disputes;' and people, as he recounted, 'admired their bravery to voice something the government does not want' (Interview with residents of Ayn Shams, Cairo, March 2005). Yet, the resistance proved short-lived. When the neighbourhood was put under a curfew after the riots, people gradually withdrew from the group and many young followers shaved and changed their white galabiyya for a pair of trousers.

'Popular support' for armed groups is a complex and highly dynamic phenomenon. It emerges from multi-layered relationships between the militants and their social environment, which shift and are transformed in processes of mobilization and violent escalation. Although the role of the civilian population has been a recurrent theme in the literature on political violence and civil wars, commonly used conceptualizations and analytical frameworks are often unable to capture this relational and dynamic quality of 'popular support'. While some parts of the research in this field focus on socio-structural conditions, others treat support as a resource that armed groups may or may not be able to mobilize, or reduce support relationships to patterns of control and compliance determined by balances of coercive power and territorial control.

The aim of this paper is to take a first step towards developing an analytical approach to studying support relationships that is able to fully capture the micro-dynamics of their formation and transformation. In order to do so, I suggest to

'disaggregate' support relationships by looking at different types of social ties and patterns of mutual dependency and influence on which they are built. I argue that the makeup, resilience and transformation of support relationships can be understood by examining the ways in which specific types of social ties combine to generate support and control, and the ways they shift over time. In particular, the paper focuses on the mechanisms in which different patterns of support relationships generate forms of symbolic influence and social control and how they interact with patterns of coercive control. I argue that – rather than entirely subordinate to the logic of violence – symbolic influence and notions of legitimacy are closely intertwined with elements of coercion and force in the micro-dynamics of support relationships, shaping the way in which control can be exerted and support be sustained over the course of violent conflicts.

The paper is divided into three main parts. The first part embeds the perspective developed here within research on the role of 'popular support' in the literature on civil wars, (counter-)insurgency and political violence. In the second section, I outline an analytical framework that examines support as a dynamic social relationship based on various forms of social ties that entail different notions of loyalty and identification as well as patterns of mutual dependence, influence and control. In particular, I discuss the relation between symbolic influence and notions of legitimacy, coercion, and control, drawing, *inter alia*, on Peter Blau's critique of Max Weber's theory of legitimate authority. The third part, then, illustrates the way support relationships form and are transformed based on two empirical case studies of militant Islamist groups, the Egyptian al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya and Hizbullah in Lebanon, which represent very different patterns of relationships and trajectories. The selection of these cases also indicates the limits of this study, which should be made explicit. While the paper, first of all, seeks to develop a theoretical framework that specifies concepts and mechanisms which, as analytical abstractions, make a claim to being, in the words of Renate Mayntz,[1] at least 'hypothetically generalizable', its external empirical validity is confined to a rather narrow set of militant Islamist groups.

POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE LITERATURE ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND CIVIL WARS

A considerable part of the earlier social science literature on civil wars, (counter-) insurgency and political violence refers the conditions of popular support for insurgent groups. While some studies on guerrilla wars and revolutions focused on socio-economic deprivation to explain what made a population 'prone' to support armed uprisings, others emphasized cultural factors such as moral economies and local 'cultures of rebellion' as well as the extent of pre-existing political organization.[2] What characterizes this literature is, firstly, a tendency to focus on macro-level conditions to explain why populations support violent insurgencies and, secondly, an understanding of support not as a (dynamic) relationship but as a 'reservoir' or a resource that is mobilized by armed groups. An exception with respect to the relational dimension of support is Joel Migdal's work, who explains popular support as the result of exchange relationships between insurgents and the local population, in

which assistance is given in return for tangible benefits provided by armed groups; a relation that over time can form the basis for mutual trust and the endorsement of the rebel's political goals.[3] Another example for an exchange-based approach is the work of Samuel Popkin, a political economist. Questioning the assumption that people support insurgent movements because they share their revolutionary ideology, he argued that peasant behaviour in civil wars follows the logic of rational self-interest, pragmatically oriented towards local issues and short-term benefit and, in particularly, driven by fear of loss and injury. In other words, people support armed actors based on a cost-benefit calculation.[4]

The past decade, however, saw a shift in perspective from macro-level conditions towards the micro-level dynamics of violence, most prominently represented by scholars such as Stathis N. Kalyvas and Jeremy Weinstein, who opened, as Elizabeth Wood put it, the 'black box' of civil wars (Wood 2008 pp.540).[5] In particular Kalyvas' 'control-collaboration model', which has become one of the most influential theoretical approaches in research on civil wars today, is of relevance here.[6] The theory's main objective is to explain patterns of violence in civil wars, for which civilian support works as a mediating variable. Because information is the key resource in unconventional warfare, and because this information is held by the local population, armed actors have to maximize collaboration from that population and minimize defection to their opponent.[7] In explaining why civilians collaborate with armed actors, the model builds, to some extent, on Popkin's notion of peasants as rational, self-interested actors, but focuses on the element of coercive control. Distinguishing supportive attitudes (or political preferences) from collaboration (support as behaviour), Kalyvas argues that the former does little to explain the latter. Driven by 'weak preferences and opportunism' and in particular by survival considerations, most civilians collaborate with the armed actor in military control of an area.[8] Territorial control, from this perspective thus has a self-reinforcing quality: when in a position to obtain information from the population, armed groups are able to use violence selectively and thus contain defection effectively and consolidate control and collaboration.[9] In other words, while Kalyvas shifts the focus of analysis towards micro-level dynamics of violence, his analysis of popular support revolves around – and ultimately considers collaboration to be a function of – coercive control by violent actors.

The emphasis on the role of information in asymmetric warfare and the need to protect and control the civilian population in Kalyvas' model corresponds quite closely to the work of some of the classic authors on counterinsurgency, such as David Galula and Roger Trinquier.[10] Their analysis is interesting here insofar as it offers a very nuanced understanding of insurgent influence over a population, in which territorial control is an important but not the sole factor determining compliance and popular support. Instead, both authors emphasize other forms of influence and the role of political organizations that connect the insurgents to – and allow them to control – the population even where government forces are present. More recent debates in the counterinsurgency literature, sparked *inter alia* by the publication of the US Army's field manual FM 3–24 in December 2006, took a renewed interest in another element of the classic counterinsurgency literature: the notion of 'winning

hearts and minds'.[11] Stressing the need to build political legitimacy in relations with the local population, the manual states that counterinsurgents must protect and provide for the population to win their support and collaboration.[12] Subsequent criticism pointed out that a 'hearts and minds'-approach is often ineffective or unrealistic under conditions of continuing terror and coercion by the insurgents and the counterinsurgents' limited capacity by counterinsurgent forces to provide and protect. Yet, while it represents a shift in emphasis, it should be noted that far from merely relying on positive incentives and persuasion the 'hearts and minds'-approach in its historical practice as well as in counterinsurgency-theory included elements of (coercive) 'population-control' and often aimed at 'winning minds' by spreading perceptions of strength and expectations of victory rather than, primarily, the belief in the rightfulness of a government. Insofar, even if its focus rests on a practitioner's perspective from the counterinsurgent's point of view, this literature is relevant for the present purpose as it refers to the dynamics of coercion, legitimacy, and control and considers different forms of influence.

Another relevant approach to studying the relationship between insurgent movements and the population is the concept of framing (frame alignment) developed in the literature on social movements which, during the past decade, has started to turn its attention to the phenomenon of political violence and civil wars.[13] In social movement research, interpretative frames and notions of collective identity have been used to analyse how movements relate to and mobilize followers and broader audiences. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, among others, have argued that 'frame resonance', that is, the fact that a movement's interpretative frames 'strike a responsive chord' among potential followers and constituencies is crucial for winning their participation and support.[14] In this process of 'frame alignment', shared grievances as well as values and the belief in the rightfulness of collective action figure prominently,[15] but it also depends on 'cultural resonance', that is, on how frames relate to a population's traditions and cultural matrix, which is why many movements include religious, ethnic, or nationalist narratives and symbols.[16] Framing processes, thereby, are closely connected to notions of collective identity. In addition to identities that link movements to wider audiences, movement-identities created by activists are deemed crucial, because they create solidarity among participants and followers.[17] In other words, while social movement research also stresses, for example, the role of social networks and institutions in facilitating recruitment and making interpretations resonate among constituencies, symbolic and communicative processes are considered central to mobilizing support. Moreover, these processes are endogenous to the process of mobilization itself, rather than relying solely on pre-existing identities, and frames and identities are produced and transformed by movement actors.

In sum, the literature on civil wars, political violence and social movements has produced a rich corpus of works examining 'popular support' on which this study seeks to build. The argument put forward here is that, rather than reducing support to a single dimension or causal factor, we need to capture the complex and dynamic nature of support relationships. To that end, I suggest to 'disaggregate' these relationships into different forms of social ties on which they may be built, and to consider support as a social relation based on mutual dependency in which

support and compliance results from the interaction of different forms of social ties and forms of influence (economic, symbolic, coercive) that shift and are transformed over the course of violent conflicts. This is particularly relevant with respect to the relation between coercive and social/symbolic forms of influence. While significantly shaped by it, support relationships are not entirely subjugated to the logic of violent coercion. In fact, one of the questions that has been raised with respect to the control-collaboration model is how armed actors can remain selective in their use of violence even in areas controlled by their adversary.[18] Or put differently: how armed actors can sustain some degree of active and passive support and contain defection in situations where they challenge a militarily much stronger opponent or where they have to operate clandestinely? This study argues that focusing on the micro-dynamics of relationships of support and control allows us to identify the way territorial control is closely tied into patterns of coercion, legitimacy and support.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

Based on existing relational approaches in the literature on civil wars and political violence – as well as theoretical works on social mechanisms of influence and control – this paper develops an analytical perspective that understands 'popular support' for armed groups not as a collective reaction to grievances or an abstract political 'preference', nor as solely a cost-benefit decision depending on expectations of superior coercive power, but as a social relationship composed of (a combination of) various forms of social ties that entail different forms of influence which may shift and transform over time. Thus, I define the term *support-relationship* to denote dynamic patterns of mutual orientation, dependency and influence emerging from sustained interaction and exchange between armed groups and certain parts of a population, which entail an element of non-coerced (active or passive) collaboration on the part of that population. The approach suggests taking a closer look at interactions within local social environments as a distinct relational 'arena' in order to identify the relational dynamics they entail as well as the mechanisms through which they are interlinked with wider violent processes. Militant groups respond to reactions from this social environment with shifts in their attitudes as well as changing patterns of behaviour, which, in turn, reshape their relationship with the local population. While armed organizations are more or less clearly defined entities, the boundary with their social environment at the local level varies and may be fluent, as armed groups often are surrounded by circles of more committed followers and are part of broader political movements. Rather than denoting an homogeneous 'actor', the social environment of armed groups thus is a relational concept, which seeks to specify various parts of a local population and following based upon their relationship with the armed group.[19]

To offer a conceptual framework that allows us to analyse the composition and transformation of support relationships, I ideal-typically distinguish four basic types of social ties at the basis of support relationships, which can create different forms of dependency, loyalty and collaboration, as well as three forms of influence and control within these relationships.[20]

Forms of Support Relationships

The first form of social ties on which support relationships may be based are relations of *utilitarian exchange*. Thereby, parts of a population collaborate with an armed group based on a cost-benefit calculation, in which support is given in exchange for tangible, collective or individual, benefits provided by the militants. Joel Migdal, on whose work this type is built, argues that stable and mutually rewarding exchange relations can lead to the gradual institutionalization of relationships which entail mutual trust and obligations of reciprocity.[21] Armed groups can provide certain (limited) benefits to their constituencies even if they have to operate underground. But, in general, territorial control is of particular importance for this kind of support relationship to emerge, because it allows armed groups to openly carry out activities such as offering medical care or education, but also because providing security and some resemblance of order is in itself the most valuable benefit delivered by armed groups.[22]

The second form of support rests on *ties of traditional loyalty* based on *kinship or patron-client relationships* and *personal (family/friendship-) relations*. Of course, these are in many respects exchange relations, too. Yet, they include the additional component of deeply engrained, customary loyalty obligations as well as close emotional ties and personal trust. During violent insurgencies, militant leaders who are members of extended-family networks may activate notions of kinship solidarity; and when insurgents manage to usurp the position of a patron (landlord, religious authority) towards a clientele, they may be able to invoke loyalty or notions of legitimate authority attached to this role.[23] Yet, traditional loyalty may not be easily transferable and is constrained by customary norms and reciprocal obligations, such as the duty of patrons to protect and provide for their clientele.

Thirdly, support relationships may be sustained by *ties of defensive communal solidarity*, in situations where the community perceives itself to be under attack or threatened in its existence and autonomy. This type is linked to traditional and kinship-loyalty, as it refers to communities and a shared sense of belonging. The difference, however, is that the threat is seen as directed against the community itself. This type of perception emerges in particular where a history of past struggles has politicized and reinforced communal identities and boundaries. Support for an armed group, then, results from the fact that the militants are identified as part of the community and as defending it and fighting on its behalf. Therefore, while customary obligations can play a role in reinforcing loyalty, the form of legitimacy-belief implied in this kind of relationships rests, at its core, rather on a notion of *representation*.

Finally, support relationships can be endogenous to the process of *political mobilization*, based on social ties formed within a social movement and between the movement and its local environment. Processes of 'frame alignment' and the emergence of collective identities referring to common values and visions of a better future play important roles in sustaining participation and connecting them to broader audiences. Moreover, movement activism creates close personal bonds between participants which form a 'brotherhood of believers' (or sisterhood). Shared experiences during demonstrations and confrontations with the police can create

powerful notions of collective identity and parts of social movements can evolve into a distinct subculture with its own values and lifestyle. But also wider parts of a population may come to approve of and support social movements and armed groups connected to them as a result of political mobilization, when their demands for political change or the values they propagate resonate with the population's grievances, experiences or religious beliefs.

Rather than fixed and separate types of support relationships, these forms of social ties should be regarded as elements that combine in varying ways to form specific patterns of relationships of support. Moreover, local variations and transformation over time can be conceptualized and analysed as varying and shifting combinations of these types of ties in patterns of support relationships. The different forms of ties, thereby, vary in the degree to which they erode or can be sustained during violent processes, as well as in the forms of influence and control they entail (see below).

Forms of Influence and Control in Support Relationships and the Role of Legitimacy

As mentioned above, support relationships constitute patterns of mutual orientation, dependency and influence. It is important to note that both sides – armed groups as well as the population in local settings – have some leverage over the other, even if the balance of power can vary considerably. Based on Amitai Etzioni's work on control in formal organizations,[24] I distinguish three types of influence: Firstly, influence based on *coercive power* (use or threat of violence or other physical sanctions); secondly, control via *utilitarian power*, which uses material/economic resources and material incentives; and, thirdly, *symbolic influence*, which is based on symbolic rewards and deprivations. Armed groups may use violent punishments or threats to deter collaborators with their enemy or to extort material support (coercive control). But the local population often dispose of some means of coercion and violence, too, and they have the ability to indirectly threaten or punish armed groups by providing information to government forces or rival groups. Both sides may have leverage over the other based on their ability to provide or withhold material resources and services on which the other side depends (utilitarian power), which includes shelter, food and information about their enemy given by the population; and services like health care, support for poor families, mediating in conflicts, but also policing provided by armed groups to the local population.

In this paper, I want to focus in particular on the third type – symbolic influence – to develop a more nuanced understanding of legitimacy in processes of political violence, and explore the way symbolic forms of control are intertwined with the use of violence and coercive control. Symbolic resources also include individual personal and emotional rewards for militant activists, such as recognition by peers, social prestige in local communities, etcetera. My main focus here, however, rests on notions of common identity and legitimacy held among a population towards an armed group.

Legitimacy, defined with reference to Max Weber as belief in the rightfulness of an armed group's authority and struggle,[25] is understood here not as an abstract

attitude or preference, but as a symbolic component of support relationships which translates into – or is 'enacted' in – forms of mutual influence and mechanisms of social control. Thereby, the different types of social ties presented above entail different forms of legitimacy. Relations of utilitarian exchange do not, per se, entail normative approval. Yet, particularly after prolonged interactions, they can generate trust and more generalized notions of reciprocity,[26] and in areas controlled by an armed group, the appreciation of the order and services provided by an armed group can evolve from resentful accommodation to acceptance and even approval of its rule, what Schlichte (with reference to Popitz) calls *basic legitimacy*.[27] In ties of traditional and kinship loyalty, personal bonds are mixed with notions of traditional legitimacy, as described by Weber.[28] Yet, it is important to recognize that this form of legitimacy originates in relationships which precede the conflict and has to be *transferred* to armed groups and their insurgent campaign, which does not always succeed. Clients' obligations to serve their patron, for example, do not cover self-sacrifice in a violent conflict against the government. And when insurgent groups usurp positions of traditional authority, they also face obligations of protection and provision, which have to be fulfilled. Social ties based on communal (defensive) solidarity is often reinforced by customary norms of non-betrayal, but the main form of legitimacy belief implied in this kind of relationship rests, at its core, on a notion of *representation*. This entails a normative as well as an identitarian component. Armed groups justify their violent campaign with reference to the community's rights and grievances, but it is also considered rightful because it is in some way seen as belonging to and fighting for the community, defending its existence and identity. Finally, in the case of support relations endogenous to the process of mobilization legitimacy is – in Weber's terminology – predominantly *charismatic*. In other words, it rests on the belief in the extraordinary quality of an armed group's leaders and ideas, and their capacity to create a better future, as well as on new bonds created between adherents of the movement as a brotherhood of followers converted to the cause.[29] Thereby, the 'charismatic' legitimacy of the movement's message – its 'frame resonance' – often derives from a peculiar combination of, on the one hand, its newness and challenge to the existing political and cultural order, and, on the other hand, the fact that it refers to established cultural or religious values, typically in the sense of appealing to the 'true' or 'higher' values of a society (justice), or as a claim to superior 'purity'. It has to be emphasised that legitimacy in the stricter sense of normative justification is closely interlinked with other forms of symbolic ties and loyalty, for example, loyalty based on personal relations. Even if in doubt about the rightfulness of a violent campaign, people may support an armed group out of personal loyalty. Particularly with respect to their effect of inspiring (active and passive) support, these may be indistinguishable.

As mentioned above, my particular theoretical concern in this paper is to develop a better understanding of the impact of legitimacy as a symbolic component of support relationships and how it is linked to coercive forms of control. Based on my previous work on the relation between armed groups and their constituencies and Peter Blau's theory of social authority, I emphasize three main functions of legitimacy and common identity in generating – and reinforcing – forms of control:

Firstly, legitimacy creates forms of symbolic power that both sides in support relationships can use to influence the other. Claims to legitimacy make armed groups vulnerable to being held to the norms and values on which they based their claim; and notions of identity and belonging create bonds that allow both sides to invoke losses and suffering as sacrifices. The reference to the sanctity of religious norms by Islamist groups to legitimate their agenda, for example, may allow religious authorities to criticize them on the basis of these norms. Particularly relevant are discourses and the 'symbolic work' surrounding *sacrifices*. When recognized in their claim to legitimate representation, the insurgents' losses or even suicide attacks can have the effect to put moral pressure on the population that identifies with them to uphold their commitment to the struggle.

A second effect of legitimacy is that it facilitates coercive control and mediates its effects on support relationships. Blau has emphasized this point in his concept of legitimacy as a *belief system that defines the exercise of social control as legitimate*.[30] In other words, the belief in the rightfulness of an armed group also enhances a population's acceptance of the coercive enforcement of compliance (in particular non-collaboration with the enemy), and acts of violence to punish collaborators run a lesser risk of provoking resistance. People may even demand an armed group to enforce non-collaboration with government forces because 'traitors' are a severe risk to supporters, too. Thus, legitimacy and coercion are – in their basis as well as in their exercise – closely intertwined.

Thirdly, legitimacy reinforces compliance in support relationships by activating mechanisms of control located within the social fabric of the population itself. This mechanism is also based on Blau's relational concept of legitimacy. In his critique of the Weberian perspective, Blau argues that the social basis of legitimacy lies in the fact that subjects as a collectivity accept the authority of a ruler as rightful and, what is crucial, consider compliance with her/his commands to be in the interest of the group as a whole.[31] Consequently, rules and the duty to obey orders are incorporated in the body of group-norms and enforced via the group's own mechanisms of social control, which include surveillance and symbolic and coercive sanctions.[32] In other words, compliance is not only reinforced by the subjects' individual belief in their own duty to obey, but also by the collectivity of subjects, via mechanisms of social control. In the case of violent insurgencies, social control as mutual surveillance by community members is of particularly importance in preventing defection, but also forms of social ostracism, public shaming, and exclusion and isolation of alleged traitors are powerful mechanisms of enforcing non-collaboration with the enemy and controlling information.

In sum, the analytical perspective developed here examines 'popular support' as a complex, dynamic social relationship that may be based on different types of social ties that can entail various forms of influence. Thereby, economic, coercive and symbolic means of control are closely intertwined. The importance of notions of legitimacy and common identity held among a population lies in creating symbolic influence and social obligations, but it also can create acceptance for coercive forms of control and activate mechanisms of social control through which the community itself detects and punishes defection. As the following two case studies seek to

illustrate, this framework allows to specify patterns of support in certain cases by examining the particular combination of social ties on which they are built – and allows to trace their transformation by analysing the way certain ties shift and are undermined or reinforced over the course of violent conflicts.

PATTERNS OF SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CASE OF TWO MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS

In the case of the two militant Islamist movements examined here – al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in Egypt and Hizbullah in Lebanon – we find similar elements of Islamist mobilization and some common elements of social ties with their social environment in certain local settings; but we also find significant differences with respect to the general patterns of support relationships that emerged as well as the way they developed over time. Therefore, the comparison is designed to allow, firstly, for an examination of common patterns of Islamist mobilization and recurring types of social ties, as well as, secondly, for an examination of different patterns and trajectories in the context of two quite different violent conflicts.

In this section, I briefly sketch the historical and political background of these two cases, before examining the way support relationships were formed. The following part, then, will focus on the way support relationships were transformed over the course of the violent conflict.

Obtaining data on these issues is challenging, particularly in conflict settings or authoritarian regimes. To reconstruct patterns and trajectories, research for this study therefore adopted a triangulation of methods and sources. First, it draws on a series of interviews with (former) members of militant groups, residents of neighbourhoods and towns known as the groups' strongholds or areas of confrontation, as well as local journalists, human rights activists and other observers. These were carried out during several periods of field-research in Egypt and Lebanon between 2004 and 2007, as well as in England (exiled activists) in April 2005 and in June/July 2005. Second, it uses autobiographical accounts by former militants, such as the story of Khaled al-Berry (al-Berry 2002), as well as a number of anthropological studies and in-depth reports by journalists on specific neighbourhoods and villages during and after the violent insurgency. A third form of data is event-data on violent incident and biographical data on fighters arrested or killed in the conflict. [33]

Islamist Mobilization, ruling the Neighbourhood: Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in Egypt

In the case of *al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya* (lit. 'The Islamic Group'), we find a quite common pattern of Islamic mobilization in an initially more or less open environment that met with a repressive government response and gradually turned into a violent insurgency. The group emerged in the late 1970s at the radical fringe of a broader Islamist student movement, at a time when the government tried to curb the growing influence of the Islamic current. After a period of suppression following the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, the group reappeared in the mid-1980s, building a presence and winning followers among students – mainly at the University of Assiut – but also around local mosques in Upper Egyptian

towns and in the suburbs of Cairo.[34] Within these spaces of mobilization, state presence was at the beginning limited, allowing for a considerable range of activities. Characteristic for the group's engagement with students as well as with residents of neighbourhoods was that it skilfully combined what Rosefsky-Wickham calls 'ideological outreach'[35] (religious and political mobilization) with providing tangible benefits and creating forms of social authority on the local level. At the university of Assiut, for example, which was one of the group's main strongholds, members of the group gave lectures on Islam and held gatherings at the university mosque, building a following that gradually evolved into a movement subculture with a core of highly committed activists. But it also offered help to students from poor families and provided services such as free lessons, cheap textbooks and separate bus transport for women.[36] Similarly, in the suburbs of Cairo, such as the neighbourhood of Ayn Shams, members of Al-Jamaa preached at a local mosque, gathering a group of young followers, but also started charitable activities involving local residents, such as collecting money for needy families, giving out free meals to poor people on holidays and initiated a project to sell basic commodities (flour, cooking oil) at discount prices. Moreover, as one al-Jamaa member claimed, the group served local residents by organizing and regulating the open market, mediating in conflicts between neighbours or families, and patrolling the area at night.[37] People seemed to approve of the Islamists' call for a return to Islam and for an Islamic order because, in its religious content, it appealed to sympathies with the broader religious current as well as traditional religious piety and, in its political content, resonated with grievances and daily experiences with arbitrary police brutality.[38] Charitable work provided benefits to residents and at the same time demonstrated their vision of a just society. In addition, particularly in some Upper Egyptian towns, al-Jamaa's local influence and support was reinforced by their connection to powerful family networks.[39]

The Islamists thus established ties with residents based on political mobilization reinforced by ties of utilitarian exchange and, in some areas, ties of traditional loyalty, in which frame resonance was reinforced by services to the community, notions of social authority and kinship relations. Yet, in shaping relationships, these ties were closely intertwined with the group's local power and violent resources – which grew with their growing number of followers. In neighbourhoods such as Western Imbaba, which was an area largely neglected by the governments and effectively without police presence, the group had become the dominating force by pushing out criminal gangs. The resemblance of order it created won them support from merchants and shop owners who, in turn, supported the group with funds and supplies, which allowed the militants to expand their charitable activities.[40] The Islamists had got rid of drug dealing and prostitution, and, as residents remembered, one could walk the streets at night: 'If there was something like a theft in the neighbourhood you could go to the *emir* [local al-Jamaa leader] and he […] would sort out the problem for you. He would catch the thief and punish him.'[41] In other words, the group's ability to coercively control the area established some form of social authority. At the same time, support and social authority reinforced their control.

Islamic Resistance, Ruling the Southern Suburbs of Beirut: Hizbullah in Lebanon

Hizbullah (lit. 'Party of God) represents a case in which Islamist mobilization took place in a quite different context, forming different patterns of support and control. The group's origins lie in a heterogeneous Islamist movement, with ties to Iraq and inspired by the Islamic Revolution. Yet, as an organization it was formed in reaction to the Israeli military occupation of South Lebanon in summer 1982, and Israeli forces and their Lebanese auxiliary militia were from the beginning the main targets of its violent campaign. In other words, Hizbullah emerged in the context of a fully fledged violent conflict against an enemy clearly identifiable as 'foreign'. Its main base was the Beqaa-valley in eastern Lebanon; after the partial Israeli withdrawal of 1985 it also built a presence in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The group's violent campaign, however, was mainly located in South Lebanon. In these three areas, patterns of territorial control were very different – shaping distinct forms of support relationships and notions of legitimacy.

In the Beqaa and from 1985 in the southern suburbs of Beirut – which were partly controlled by Syria and (at least Beirut) by the Shiite Amal militia – Hizbullah was able to operate and mobilize more or less openly, forming a committed core of followers and building ties with the local population along lines which bore some similarity to those observed in the case of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya. In the city of Baalbek in the Beqaa-valley, the group's call for a return to Islam as well as its fiercely anti-Israeli propaganda resonated among parts of the local population who had been gripped by, as one resident at the time put it, 'the Shiite fever' and were enraged by the Israeli invasion.[42] Hizbullah and their Iranian allies combined their revolutionary message with providing more tangible benefits to the population, for example, by offering free medical treatment and providing assistance to families of people injured in violent clashes.[43] Moreover, several leaders of Hizbullah were also members of powerful family clans, which are a prominent feature of the Beqaa's social and political structure, allowing them to access social networks and mobilize traditional loyalty to reinforce ties based on political mobilization and utilitarian exchange. In the southern suburbs of Beirut the group was initially weaker, operating semi-clandestinely, but its expansion followed a similar logic. Local mosques and religious-study groups served as foci of mobilization, attracting young men and women who gradually formed a circle of committed activists and followers, exerting increasing influence on local mosque-congregations.[44] They then reached out to and involved families and local residents via religious services and charitable work, skilfully integrating their vision of a return to Islam and movement-identities with family bonds and reference to the wider Shiite community, thus forming strong notions of loyalty based on the Islamist message and on identification with the movement as well as the appreciation of services provided.[45]

In contrast to the Beqaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut, the area where the violent insurgency itself took place – that is, South Lebanon and from 1985 on the security zone along the border (including a broad corridor to the north, including the town of Jezzine) – was an area controlled by Israeli forces and their Lebanese auxiliary militia, the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Violent resistance by a number of different groups started in late 1982 and soon found widespread support among

the local Shiite population, as visible in frequent local protests and strikes, and the general refusal to cooperate with Israeli forces. Moreover, this support seemed to increase, rather than weaken, when the IDF adopted an 'iron-fist'-policy to suppress the insurgency.[46] Interestingly, Hizbullah initially was an outsider to local support relationships in the South; most people identified with Amal which at the time was the main Shiite social and political force. Yet, the group gradually managed to recruit young men from the area and win support among local communities, particularly around local sheikhs affiliated with the group, such as Raghib Harb in Jibshit, and following successful operations of the 'Islamic Resistance'.[47] Islamist mobilization around local religious seminars, for example, in Nabatiyeh, played an important role in forging relations between Hizbullah and its most committed followers. But the basis for gradually forming support relationships in the south was, in particular, ties based on communal identification with the insurgency among parts of the local Shiite population: Hizbullah came to be identified as part of the community, as fighting for its land and rights, and villagers stressed that the fighters were sons of local families.[48]

In sum, the two cases displayed some common elements of Islamist mobilization and social ties in neighbourhoods partially 'ruled' by the militant groups. Thereby, the patterns of control in spaces where the groups emerged and mobilized shaped relations with their social environment; at the same time, support relationships and notions of legitimacy created forms of social control as well as economic and coercive power, illustrating the close and complex connection of support, legitimacy and control, and the mechanisms in which support can reinforce control. Yet, due to the different dynamics of violent conflict, the patterns of support relationships that emerged also differed in important respects, with ties of communal solidarity forming mainly in southern Lebanon, which become even more discernible when examining their development over time.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

As mentioned above, support relationships are highly dynamic. They emerge from interactions between armed groups and their constituencies and are transformed in processes of political violence. In particular, two dynamics can be observed that reshape relationship patterns. Firstly, violent confrontations and shifting balances of military power and territorial control radically change conditions for support and exert compelling pressure on the local population. Secondly, interactions between armed groups and the local population can undermine or consolidate support relationships. These 'internal' dynamics of interaction are intertwined with balances of military power, of course, but exert an additional effect – accelerating the erosion of support or contributing to their resilience despite disadvantageous power balances. Building upon the analytical framework outlined above, the transformation of support relationships cannot only be described in terms of fragmentation or consolidation, but also as shifts in the types of social ties on which support relationships are built, and shifts in the available forms of influence and control. It is in these patterns of transformation that the basis and limits and condition of different patterns of support and become discernible.

Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya: Aggressive Interactions with the Population, Repression, and the Fragmentation of Support Relationships

The escalation of political violence in Egypt revolved around a process in which the state attempted to retake control of formerly (semi-)open or neglected spaces. Government forces restricted activities at the University of Assiut, and moved against mosques and into neighbourhoods known to be strongholds of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya. In some neighbourhoods, police incursions provoked local resistance in which residents sided with the Islamist groups. As briefly described at the very beginning of this paper, in Ayn Shams in August 1988, for example, police met fierce resistance when they tried to arrests al-Jamaa activists at a local mosque. Witnesses recounted that many ordinary residents took part in the street battles, including teenagers and women throwing stones from balconies, and people provided refuge to Islamist activists when they were pursued by the police.[49] The perception expressed by residents in interviews was that police had attacked without justification and that the activists were young people from the neighbourhood who had just defended themselves. Thereby, the group's considerable local support in the neighbourhood also translated into some degree of influence to contain defection, including mechanisms of social control. This is illustrated, for example, by the account of one resident of Ayn Shams, who emphasized that 'good people' never collaborated with the police, indicating that collaboration was ostracized by supportive parts of the community.[50] Yet, accounts by residents also made clear that there were limits to this support: while they expressed sympathy for acts of 'self-defence', residents unanimously rejected the assassination of politicians or any broader insurgent campaign to bring down the government.[51] In other words, legitimacy built by Islamist mobilization and by providing benefits at the local level was not directly transferable into support for an insurgent campaign. Interestingly, resistance by local residents seemed far less in the case of Imbaba, where al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya had had a much greater degree of control for a much longer period of time. There, due to its dominating role, attempts by the Islamist group to impose an Islamic moral order were more pronounced and had undermined support relationships with local residents even before the police incursion in 1992. By banning smoking and playing cards in street cafés and music at wedding celebrations, or reprimanding women for wearing 'improper' attire, the group caused, as Patrick Haenni argues, serious resentments.[52] As a result, voluntary donations from merchants decreased, to which the militant groups reacted by extorting a 'tax' and burning down shops of merchants who refused to pay, which further undermined their legitimacy among the local population.[53] In other words, in this area, 'territorial control' had triggered a dynamic of aggressive interaction that undermined support relationships with the local population, rather than reinforcing them. Thereby, the gradual transformation of support relationships was discernible in shifts from symbolic influence to coercive forms of control, which, however, proved unstable.

In Assiut, where the group emerged and which was its greatest stronghold, al-Jamaa was embedded in a movement subculture and had a strong and committed following that provided staunch support during several years of confrontations with the police around Islamist gatherings and protests, starting in 1986 and well into

the violent insurgency. In May 1993, about one and a half years after the insurgency began, a demonstration against detention and military trials against al-Jamaa members drew an estimated 3000 people. Similarly, even after large contingents of riot police were deployed in the area and a partial curfew put in place, continuing support among parts of the local population in towns and villages seemed to prevent them from collaborating with security forces.[54] Yet, from about early 1994 on, signs support relationships began to erode became more frequent, including growing numbers of informers and instances of local resistance against the insurgents. In addition to the government forces' continuing (or consolidating) military control over the city and many villages, the growing restraint of police in relation to local residents contributed to this development, as did tensions between the militants and the population which resulted from a similar dynamic of aggressive interactions. As one original leader of al-Jamaa admitted, violent acts to punish 'moral transgression' caused resentment and undermined the legitimacy of the group's message.[55] Moreover, the militants' attempts prevent collaboration with the government by killing village guards, mayors and alleged police-informants accelerated the deterioration of relationships with the local population. On several occasions, these acts triggered cycles of revenge, in which the victim's families killed family members of al-Jamaa-militants and vice versa.

In sum, what we see in the case of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya is that while relations based on utilitarian exchange and the provision of benefits eroded quickly when violent confrontations escalated and police took control of neighbourhoods and villages, ties build in the process of Islamist mobilization and ties-based personal relations (in some cases also kinship-loyalties) seemed able to sustain loyalty and prevent defection for some time during the violent insurgency, but ultimately fragmented. It is interesting, thereby, that greater degrees of control over an area before violence escalated did not necessarily translate into greater loyalty afterwards; and that interactions between the militants and their (former) constituencies significantly contributed to the erosion of support. In other words, dynamics of military power-balances and territorial control were intertwined with interactive dynamics endogenous to the relationship between militant groups and the local population, reinforcing or eroding patterns of support and control.

Hizbullah: Consolidation of Support and Control

In the case of Hizbullah, rather than weakening and fragmenting, support relationships consolidated over the course of the violent insurgency. In this process, growing legitimacy on the local and national level, social control over the population, and military strength and territorial control in some parts of the country mutually reinforced each other. When assessing the overall trajectory of Hizbullah, other factors have to be taken into account too, of course. The militant group received a significant degree of financial and logistical support from Iran, which allowed it to engage in an extensive campaign to provide welfare and other benefits to residents of the suburbs of Beirut and other areas; and efficacy of the IDF's counterinsurgency campaign was somewhat hampered by the fact that it was a foreign military force in Lebanon, despite the SLA as its local auxiliary militia. In the following, I will focus on the

micro-dynamics of support relationships between the group and different parts of the Shiite population, arguing that they represent one – crucial – factor that contributed to the ultimate success of Hizbullah's 'resistance' in South Lebanon, where loyalty given merely in exchange for (Iranian-sponsored) benefits was short-lived. Moreover, I argue that communal coherence and mechanisms of social control significantly contributed to containing collaboration with the SLA, ensuring that that the militia remained a 'foreign' entity.

In the southern suburbs of Beirut, Hizbullah's increasing nominal (military) control over the area, particularly after 1989, combined with the relative disciplined conduct of their fighters and public services provided to the population, was a major factor in consolidating a form of 'basic legitimacy' among the population. Providing some resemblance of order and security to residents at a time when armed militias and ongoing confrontations had become a menace to people's lives, as one resident explained, '…helped that Hizbullah could assert itself. Many who were not necessarily Hizbullah[-sympathizers] accepted and respected them.'[56] Over the course of the 1990s, the group expanded its charitable activities into a vast institutional network that provided health care, education and a variety of other public services to tens of thousands of residents.[57] By the late 1990s, Hizbullah's rule over the suburbs was recognized as legitimate to the degree that people accepted – and expected – the group to be in charge of 'policing' and an institutionalized system of arbitration and courts existed to manage conflicts and deal with crime, illustrating the close and mutually reinforcing connection between legitimacy and control. Another example of the interrelation between legitimacy, power and control is Hizbullah's role in mediating in conflicts and blood feuds between family clans in the Beqaa-valley.[58] On the one hand, the group's recognition as mediator and their successful negotiations confirmed and reinforced the group's political authority. On the other hand, these processes allowed Hizbullah to supersede certain clans as armed competitors and assert effective control over certain areas, when they used their military power to settle conflicts and enforce rulings.[59]

In the south, too, support relationships consolidated over the course of the insurgency, but in a somewhat different pattern. While shifts in the boundaries of the Israeli-controlled security-zone allowed Hizbullah slightly greater freedom of operation, it never came close to any degree of territorial control similar to the southern suburbs, and villages in the vicinity of the zone were constantly subject to IDF and SLA-incursions or retaliatory shelling. Also, 'benefits' provided to residents in the form of reconstructing houses destroyed in the fighting might have served to reinforce support, but collaboration was certainly not the result of a material 'cost-benefit-calculation'. Rather, the remarkable resilience of support under continuing pressure in an area controlled by Israeli and SLA-forces was based on the consolidation of ties of communal loyalty through continuing local recruitment and the adaptation of the militants' agenda and behaviour in reaction to resistance. The group had, for example, reduced risky violent tactics that were seen as 'wasting' young militants (who were the sons of local farmers), and reduced attempts to impose elements of an Islamic moral order where this was rejected by the population. During the 1990s, Hizbullah sustained a level of support in many villages that not only allowed it to

operate clandestinely in areas directly controlled by the IDF and SLA, but also to maintain a significant level of control over collaboration and even disrupt Israeli attempts of infiltration.[60] Indications for this pattern of support and control include, for example, the documented difficulties of Israeli forces to oblige village mayors to form 'self-defence militias' (against the insurgents) and recruit young men from Shiite villages for the SLA.[61] Thereby, the group certainly used some degree of coercion to punish informers, but control rested also on symbolic forms of influence and social control, as discernible in discourses and the 'symbolic work' surrounding *sacrifices*. As one elderly man from a southern Lebanese village explained: 'I am grateful for the work of Jihad al-Bina [Holy Struggle for Reconstruction], of course. But what matters isn't them fixing my house. It's them sacrificing their lives … I can't pay back what I owe them for that.'[62]

In sum, in the case of Hizbullah we see a pattern of gradual consolidation of relationships of support and control in which different types of social ties were reinforced and expanded in various ways in different areas of operation. In addition to ties based on political mobilization, and in addition to loyalty based on kinship-ties, exchange relations and forms of basic legitimacy seemed particularly important to support relationships in areas controlled by the group, such as the southern suburbs. In South Lebanon, in contrast, Hizbullah exerted a considerable degree of social control in an area largely dominated by their opponent, sustained, as I argue, by patterns of communal solidarity that not only proved resilient under severe degrees of pressure by the SLA and Israeli forces, but which also entailed a significant degree of control over defection.

CONCLUSIONS: DYNAMICS OF SUPPORT, LEGITIMACY, AND CONTROL

The two short case studies presented above serve to illustrate the paper's more general point that 'popular support' is a multi-layered and dynamic phenomenon. In both cases, relationship patterns varied across different local settings and were transformed over the course of the violent conflict. I argue that 'disaggregating' support relationships by specifying different social ties on which they may be built, and by distinguishing different forms of mutual influence they may entail, helps us to understand variance in their composition as well as to trace shifts over time.

Support relationships are to a considerable extent shaped by balances of military power and patterns of territorial control in a given area, as well as by dynamics of violent escalation. Yet, the extent to which different types of social ties depend on control over an area varies significantly, as does their resilience under pressure. Support build on ties of utilitarian exchange obviously relies on an armed group's ability to operate openly and provide not only material benefits and services but also some degree of security and order to the population. Accordingly, support relationships based (mainly) on this type are undermined rather quickly when control over an area is lost. Political mobilization is less dependent on territorial control, and ties among the core of committed followers often seem to sustain a considerable degree of pressure, but the ability to conduct activities of 'ideological outreach' openly and the extent to which sympathizers and peripheral followers have to fear persecution

and punishment significantly influences its impact. Loyalty based on personal relations and kinship ties can be very resilient, but they are not always readily transferable. It is mostly in combination with ties of defensive communal solidarity against an external enemy that support relationships develop the greatest resilience and are able to sustain a considerable degree of collaboration and control even under pressure, and often seem to be temporally reinforced rather than undermined by episodes of violent confrontations.

With respect to the control-collaboration model, one of the most important conclusions is thereby that coercive power and territorial control are not an entirely independent variable, but can under certain circumstances be determined to a considerable extent by the nature of support relationships and can be significantly reinforced or undermined by their interaction with patterns of social control and symbolic influence. Particularly in highly asymmetric conflicts, during low-level insurgencies, and during phases of transformation, mechanisms of social control seem crucial in shaping the trajectory of processes of political violence. On the other hand, the case study on al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in Egypt also shows that the erosion of support under pressure is not exclusively a function of territorial control by (and pressure from) an armed group's opponent. Aggressive interactions between militant groups and the local population can create tensions and undermine support relationships also – and in some cases particularly – where the militants are in control of an area.

The principal argument behind the perspective put forward here is that to fully understand the variation and dynamics of 'popular support' in violent insurgencies we have to take a closer look at the basis of support relationships and at the microdynamics of legitimacy, violence and control they entail. In particular, this paper emphasizes the role of symbolic forms of influence and the way they are intertwined with – and reinforce or undermine – coercive forms of control. The importance of notions of legitimacy among a population lies in the way it creates forms of symbolic influence (i.e. notions of sacrifice and reciprocal obligations), in the fact that it can generate acceptance and thereby reduce the costs of violent forms of controlling defection, and in the fact that it triggers mechanisms of social control through which the community itself enforces on-collaboration and contains defection. Thereby, this approach also seeks to offer a more nuanced perspective on legitimacy. Legitimacy is not an abstract political preference but a social relationship that translates into particular forms of social interactions with tangible effects, triggering or facilitating forms of social control, and it represents a symbolic resource that both sides can use to influence the other.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR

Stefan Malthaner is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Sciences and Government at Aarhus University, Denmark. His research interests include political violence, civil wars and militant movements. Among his publications are 'Mobilizing the Faithful: Militant Islamist Groups and their Constituencies' (Campus, 2011); 'Dynamics of Political Violence' (ed., with Lorenzo Bosi and

Chares Demetriou, Ashgate 2014) and 'Radical Milieus' (ed., with Peter Waldmann, Campus, 2011).

NOTES

1. See Renate Mayntz, 'Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen' in Renate Mayntz (ed.) *Akteure – Mechanismen – Modelle: Zu Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen* (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag 2002) p.16.
2. For e.g.: Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970); Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers 1969); James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1976); Jeffery M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: The Free Press 1975); and Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992).
3. Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).
4. See Wickham-Crowley (1992) pp.138; Samuel Popkin, 'Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam' in Michael Taylor (ed.) *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) pp.9–62.
5. Elizabeth J. Wood, 'The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks', *Annual Review of Sociology* 11 (2008) pp.539–61, p.540; Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006); Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'Micro-level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-collaboration Model', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24 (2012) pp.658–68; Jeremy M. Weinstein Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007).
6. Kalyvas 2006–12. Among the works who have adopted elements of the 'control-collaboration' model and which relevant for the topic discussed here are: Reed Morrison Wood, *Competing for Control: Conflict, Power Dynamics, Civilian Loyalties and Violence in Civil War,* PhD Thesis, University of North Carolina (2010); and Ana Arjona, *Social Order in Civil War* PhD Thesis, Yale University (2010).
7. Kalyvas (2006) p.91; Kalyvas (2012) p.660.
8. Kalyvas (2006) pp.93–94, 103, 111–16.
9. Kalyvas (2006) pp.173–179; Kalyvas (2012) pp.658–668.
10. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger 1964). Roger Triniquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger 1964).
11. The term was introduced by British General Gerald Templer during the Malayan Emergency in 1952 and later used by Robert Thompson. See Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto & Windus 1966).
12. Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC, United States Government 2006), see pp.1–1, 1–3, 1–8, 1–9). See also Ivan Arreguin-Toft, 'Tunnel at the End of the Light: A Critique of US Counter-terrorist Grand Strategy', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 15/3 (2002) pp.549–563; David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (London: Hurst 2010); Michael Fitzsimmons, 'Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy', *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 31/3 (2008) pp.337–65.
13. See for e.g. Donatella della Porta, *Political Violence and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); Lorenzo Bosi and Donatella della Porta, 'Micro-mobilization into Armed Groups: The Ideological, Instrumental and Solidaristic Paths', *Qualitative Sociology* (forthcoming); Chares Demetriou, 'Political Violence and Legitimation: The Episode of Colonial Cyprus', *Qualitative Sociology* 30/2 (2007); Eitan Alimi and Hank Johnston, 'Primary Frameworks, Contentious Interactions, and the Radicalization of Palestinian Nationalism' in Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou, Stefan Malthaner (eds) *Dynamics of Radicalization: A Processual Perspective* (London: Ashgate forthcoming); Jocelyn Viterna, 'Radical or Righteous? Using Gender to Shape Public Perceptions of Political Violence' in Bosi/Demetriou/Malthaner (eds) *Dynamics of Radicalization* (forthcoming). Carrie Rosefsky Wickham and Quintan Wiktorowicz, among others, have applied framing-approaches in particular to the study of Islamist movements. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory' in Q. Wiktorowicz (ed.) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2004), p. 1–35;

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, 'Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt' in Q. Wiktorowicz (ed.) *Islamic Activism* (2004) pp.231–49.

14. See David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization', *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988) pp.198–99. As Sidney Tarrow put it, social movements need to produce 'collective action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention with powerful opponents'. Tarrow (1998) p.23.

15. Frame resonance is the successful outcome of processes – and deliberate strategies – of linking a movement's interpretative orientation with that of individuals and milieus and audiences targeted for mobilization. See David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986) pp.469–71. See also Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000) pp.611–39.

16. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) p.107, 122.

17. See Tarrow (1998) p.119. Also: Donatella della Porta and Marion Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1999) pp.87–92.

18. See Gonzalo Vargas, 'Urban Irregular Warfare and Violence Against Civilians: Evidence From a Colombian City', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21/1 (2009) pp.110–132; Stathis N. Kalyvas (2012) p.662.

19. See also Malthaner (2011) pp.31–32.

20. This classification summarizes some of the arguments offered in the literature on political violence and civil wars; see also: Stefan Malthaner, *Mobilizing the Faithful: Militant Islamist Groups and their Constituencies* (Campus: Frankfurt and New York, 2011) pp.45–51.

21. Joel Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) pp.224–254. On popular support created by state-like services provided by armed groups see also Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, 'The Rise (and Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Movements in Latin America', *Sociological Forum* 2 (1987) pp.473–99; and Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

22. Insofar this type of support is close to basic legitimacy, a concept introduced by Klaus Schlichte (based on Popitz) to the study of armed groups, which denotes approval and collaboration given by local populations in return for security and order provided by groups which managed to bring a certain territory under their control. See Klaus Schlichte, *In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of armed Groups* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2010).

23. See James C. Scott, 'Patron-Client Politics and Change in Southeast Asia' in S. C. Sarkesian (ed.) *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare* (Chicago: Precedent Publishing 1975) pp.303–321.

24. See Amitai Etzioni, *A comparative analysis of complex organizations: On power, involvement, and their correlates* (New York: The Free Press 1961) pp.3–21; Amitai Etzioni, 'The Compliance Model: Organizational Control And Leadership' in E. Gross and A. Etzioni (eds) *Organizations in society* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1985) pp.108–22.

25. See Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Neu Isenburg: Melzer Verlag 2005 [1922]) pp.22–23, 157–9.

26. See Migdal (1974), pp.249–50.

27. Schlichte (2010) pp.91–95.

28. See Weber (2005 [1922]), as well as Craig Matheson, 'Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy', *The British Journal of Sociology* 38/2 (1987) pp.206–07.

29. On the charismatic quality of programmes/ideas, see also Schlichte (2010), who analyses the evolution of charismatic leadership and ideas in the case of armed groups after taking over power.

30. Peter M. Blau, 'Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority', *The American Political Science Review* XX (1963) p.308.

31. Peter M. Blau (1963) pp.305–16.

32. Peter M. Blau (1963) pp.312–13.

33. Autobiographical accounts include, for e.g. Khaled Al-Berry, *La terre est plus belle que le paradis* (Paris: JC Lattès 2002). For anthropological studies *see* for e.g. Patrick Haenni, *L'ordre des caïds: conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire* (Paris: Karthala 2005) on a neighbourhood in the northeastern suburbs of Cairo; or Patrick D. Gaffney 'Fundamentalist preaching and Islamic militancy in Upper Egypt' in Appleby, R. S. (ed.) *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East* (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press 1997) pp.257–293, on al-Minya; or Toth (2003). For details of field research in Egypt and Lebanon, *see* Malthaner (2011). To protect

informants, no names are given in references to interviews and the place and date of interviews are identified only in very general terms.

34. By the late 1980s, al-Jamaa's followers among University students and around local mosques counted in the thousands. See Robert Springborn Robert, *Mubaraks Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Boulder and London: Westview Press 1989) pp.226–27; Arian Fariborz, *Die ägyptische Studentenbewegung: Ursachen, Auswirkungen und Perspektiven des sozialen Protests* (Hamburg: Lit Verlag 1999) pp.149–50.

35. See Rosefsky Wickham (2004) pp.231–49.

36. Interview with al-Jamaa leader, England, March 2006. See also Fariborz (1999) pp.150; Springborn (1989) pp.226–27.

37. Interview with al-Jamaa member, England, March 2006.

38. Interview with resident of Ayn Shams, Cairo, March 2005.

39. Mamoun Fandy, 'Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional revenge?', *Middle East Journal* 48/4 (1994) pp.607–25.

40. See Patrick Haenni, *L'ordre des caïds: conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire* (Paris: Karthala 2005) pp.33–35, 40–42, 73–78, 105, 115–118.

41. Interview, cited in *Al-Ahram*, weekly ed., Cairo, 17–23 Dec. 1992.

42. Resident of Baalbek interviewed for *L'Orient le-Jour*, 8 Nov. 1983.

43. See Andreas Rieck, *Die Schiiten und der Kampf um den Libanon: Politische Chronik 1958–1988* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut 1989) pp.417; Ferdinand Smit, *The battle for South Lebanon: The radicalization of Lebanon's Shi'ites 1982–1985* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bulaaq 2000) p.213.

44. See, for e.g. Sherareh's account of a mosque in Ghubeiri (later called 'Imam al-Mahdi mosque'), Wadhah Sherareh, *Dawlat Hizb'allah: Lubnan mujtama'a islamiyya* (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar 2000) pp.200–10.

45. See Sherareh (2000) pp.206–08.

46. See Smit (2000) pp.206; Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press 1997) pp.22. On the geographical distribution of insurgent attacks, see also Malthaner (2011) pp.202–04, 218–23.

47. Data on the origin of Hizbullah fighters killed in the insurgency indicated that whereas in 1983, more than half (51.5%) of the group's 'martyrs' came from Beirut and the Beqaa, in 1986 they were predominantly (82.5%) from the South. See Malthaner (2011) pp.190–91, 223–24.

48. Interview villager from Maroun al-Ras, December 2007, recorded by S. Steins; author's conversation with residents of South Lebanese village, July 2007. Very similar statements were recorded by journalists N. Blanford for the Time, 15 Aug. 2006 and Bill Cevil, Workers World, 30 Nov. 2006.

49. Interview with residents of Ayn Shams, Cairo, March 2006. See also report in *al-Wafd* (Cairo), 14 Aug. 1988.

50. Interview with resident of Ayn Shams, March 2005.

51. Interview with residents of Ayn Shams, March 2006.

52. Haenni (2005) p.103.

53. See on this process Haenni (2005) pp.33–38, 103–05, 115–18.

54. In late 1993, for e.g. the police chief of Assiut accused the population of 'complete passivity' in the fight against al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya. See AP, 18 Jan. 1994.

55. Osama Hafez, interview with Mukrim M. Ahmad, published in *Al-Mussawar*, No. 4055, 28 Jun. 2002, pp.8–10.

56. Interviews with residents of the southern suburbs and West Beirut, April 2005, July 2007.

57. See Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The changing face of terrorism* (London: Tauris 2005) pp.83–86, Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The story from within* (London: Saqi 2005) pp.83–84, and Dima Danawi, *Hizballah's pulse: Into the dilemma of Al-Shahid and Jihad Al-Bina foundations* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2002) pp.77–79.

58. For the period between the mid 1980s until the late 1990s, Hamzeh estimates that Hizbullah mediated in about 200 blood feuds. See Nizar A. Hamzeh, 'Clan Conflicts, Hezbollah and the Lebanese state', *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 19/4 (1994) pp.433–446; Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the path of Hizbullah* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 2004) pp.107–09.

59. Hamzeh (1994) p.440.

60. See Clive Jones, 'Israeli Counter-insurgency Strategy and the War in South Lebanon 1985–97', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 8/3 (1997) pp.82–108; Frederic M. Wehrey, 'A Clash of Wills: Hizballah's Psychological Campaign against Israel in South Lebanon', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 13/3 (2002) pp.53–74; and Malthaner (2011) pp.218–26.

61. See Smit (2000) pp.178–82; UNIFIL reports S/15863 (12 Jul. 1983) and S/17557 (10 Oct. 1985).

62. Interview by Laura King for AP, 12 Mar. 1999.